From
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Here's how the MSA (master settlement agreement) allows states to put pressure on NPMs (non-participating manufacturers):
the model escrow statute requires an NPM selling cigarettes in [*1122] a given state to do one of two things: 1) join the MSA, agreeing to "become a participating manufacturer (as that term is defined in section II(jj) of the [MSA]) and generally perform its financial obligations under the [MSA]," or 2) make similar annual payments into the state's escrow fund.[26] An NPM's annual escrow payments in a particular state are calculated by multiplying a per-cigarette amount, established by the state's legislature and set forth in the statute, by the number of cigarettes the NPM sold in that state in the year for which payment is being made.[27] The parties agree that this per-cigarette amount is roughly equivalent to the per-cigarette amount the MSA requires from OPMs and SPMs for sales which are not exempt. To the extent it differs, the OPMs pay slightly more than the SPMs, which pay slightly more than the NPMs.[28]
So basically a NPM has to pay more (under the model escrow statute, and all states have adopted something similar).
But ...
As I read the Wikipedia article, the penalties against NPMs (non-participating manufacturers) are assessed
per cigarette, as opposed to revenue. How precisely this applies to PV manufacturers is obviously unclear.
However three of the four OPMs (original participating manufacturers) are PMI (now Altria), Lorillard, and Reynolds - a point which couldn't have escaped the notice of Harkin & co. In other words, those mfr.s are bound by the settlement. But if the states try to enforce it against them based on PV marketing, there will obviously be litigation about whether the MSA merely applies to tobacco cigarettes.
(In fact as I understand it, it never applied to cigar, snuff, and pipe tobacco manufacturers. That's why you can still buy flavored cigars. Note that they also contain nicotine. So the logic in Harkin et. al's missive is a tad twisted. Does the MSA apply to PVs because they contain nicotine? Or only to those that "look like" cigarettes
and contain nicotine? What about those that "look like" cigarettes
but lack nicotine? The mind boggles
Bear in mind, of course, that just because the MSA says that penalties are assessed per cigarette ultimately means very little - if the states wish to just haul off and pass taxes on vaping supplies. They don't need the MSA to pass anti-vaping legislation of any kind.
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In the short- and intermediate-term, I'm not sure how much of the money can be used for research and education. Research money could be used to fund hit job studies. Education money could be used to fund advertising (I don't have to explain what the effect of that might be). Or perhaps "vaping abstinence" programs in schools. What about "vaping cessation" programs, or therapies?
As far as I can tell, no one besides a tobacco company would have legal "standing" to contest how the states spend the money. In other words, if vapers outnumber smokers three years from now, all the funding currently dedicated to anti-cigarette education and advertising could then be transferred to corresponding anti-vaping measures (unless a tobacco company involved in the settlement objects).
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It's also interesting to note the "Securitization" section of the article. Many states have issued bonds against future payments. Which means they've probably already spent much of the money. In fact, the most cash-strapped states are mostly those which may be particularly inclined to apply the money against vaping.
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So yes, this could be big trouble. Or it could be a political stunt. I'm more inclined to consider it to be more of the latter at the moment. However, it will take a few years and perhaps a good deal of litigation before we really know.
That said, if there are hardly any smokers left in five years ... vapers are going to be the next target.
On the other hand, gobs of "tobacco control" money is
already being spent against vaping, in the form of grant money for journals, conferences, and other research purposes. Not to mention nonprofits and the salaries of state, local, and federal staff who are wholly or in part compensated to reduce smoking prevalence.
For some reason, no one has bothered to ask whether all of this money is justifiably directed towards vaping. (For ex., how can the ALA justify paying people to issue anti-vaping press releases, when there's no evidence that vaping damages lung tissue?) And the ACA (etc.)?